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NOTES
SUBROGATION OR SUB TERFUGE:
THE MYTH OF ERISA HEALTH BENEFIT
PLANS

GeraldF. Murphy
I. INTRODUCrION
John was a factory worker making $28,000 a year before taxes. Two
years ago he was involved in a car accident in which he was struck by a
drunk driver. The debilitating injuries he received severely limited his
ability to work and support his family. John's medical expenses and
related costs exceeded $500,000. Although he only received $300,000 from
his employee benefit insurance plan and $200,000 in damages from the
driver who hit him, John is still $200,000 in debt.
Employee. health benefit plans are governed by the Employee
Retirement Income and Securities Act [hereinafter ERISA].' Under an
ERISA plan, both the employees and the employer contribute; however,
the employers are the predominate contributors and are essentially put in
the position of the insurer.2 These plans usually contain subrogation
and/or reimbursement provisions. These provisions stipulate that, in the
event of recovery from a third party tortfeasor, the plan will be entitled to
reimbursement for any money paid out for medical expenses. Neither
ERISA itself, nor language contained in the plans, contemplate the
aforementioned hypothetical involving the now heavily indebted factory
worker.
The "make-whole" doctrine is an equitable principle, which would have
protected John. It states an insured who settles with a third-party
tortfeasor is liable to the insurer-subrogee only for the excess received

1. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
2. Sunbeam-Oster Co., Inc. Group Benefits Plan for Salaried and NonBargaining Hourly Employees v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d 1368, 1370 (5th Cir. 1996)
("Participants were required to make contributions to the Plan, but as their total
contributions were insufficient to pay the aggregate costs of covered services,
claims were largely paid from the general assets of Sunbeam.").
3. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
309
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over the total amount of their loss. 4 Judge Posner recognized that the
"make-whole rule is most likely to apply in a case of catastrophic loss,
where full insurance is rare."5 Seemingly, it would follow that this rule is
in line with the very purpose of insurance, that of guarding against loss.
Furthermore, it is quite doubtful that employees covered under such plans
are cognizant of the fact that their "insurance" will seek to be indemnified
from any recovery they may obtain, even if doing so may render them
hundreds of thousands of dollars short of being able to pay for their
medical bills. In such cases where an insured does not obtain third-party
recovery, the plan will not seek reimbursement. However, if the insured
does make a recovery, allowing him to break even, the plan will attempt to
exercise its right to reimbursement. This may leave the insured debtridden and no better off than if they had not sought third-party recovery at
all.
ERISA pre-empts state law and therefore, conflicts over rights to plan
recovery fall exclusively under federal jurisdiction.6 The place of the
federal common law make-whole rule has precipitated a dramatic circuit
split, part of which was aired before the Supreme Court in Great-West Life
Insurance and Annuity v. Knudson.7 The primary effect of the Court's
decision will be to further complicate subrogation/reimbursement
litigation under ERISA. This note predominately focuses on the future
application and vitality of the make-whole rule, and the potential impact
of the Great-West decision, thoroughly exploring the rationale employed
by the Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in their persistent call for the
rule's preservation.
II. PRIOR LAW
ERISA's primary function is the protection of employees'
retirement expectations by creating a national standard that reserves the
regulation of employee benefit plans to the federal government.8
"ERISA
Employee health plans fall under this broad mandate.
benefit
employee
welfare
comprehensively regulates, among other things,
plans that, 'through the purchase of insurance or otherwise,' provide

4. Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1520 (11th Cir. 1997).
5. Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1993).
6. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 52.
7. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
8. MK Gaedeke Roland, Looking for a PrinceAmong the Frogs: Solutions to
ERISA's Preemptive Effect on Improving Health Care, 47 BUFFALO L. REV. 1487,
(1999).
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medical, surgical, or hospital care, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability or death." 9

A. Supreme CourtDecisions
1. Pilot Life Insurancev. Dedeaux
Central to ERISA is the notion of uniformity. Illustrative of this
principle is the clear Congressional intent for "all suits brought by
beneficiaries or participants asserting improper processing of claims under
ERISA-regulated plans be treated as federal questions.... '' Having to
rectify the laws of each and every one of the fifty states would contravene
this express mandate. "The uniformity of decisions which the Act is
designed to foster will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to
predict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity of reference
to varying state laws."" The Court has found that disputes arising out of
subrogation and reimbursement clauses clearly fit within their
jurisdiction.'2
Having set forth the bounds of federal preemption of suits stemming
from improper processing of claims, the Court pointed to ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions found in section 502(a)(3) as the exclusive means
for obtaining relief under ERISA."3 Legislative history shows that this
section was modeled on an equally powerful and preemptive provision,
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.'4 It follows then,
"

9. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§1002(1) (2000)). The Court held that ERISA preempts state common law tort
and contract actions asserting an insurer's improper processing of an employee's
claim for disability benefits under an insured employee benefit plan. Id.
10. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 56.
11. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, p. 12 (1973) reprinted in 2 Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History of ERISA, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess., 2359 (Comm. Print 1976)).
12. FMC Corp., 489 U.S. at 61.
13. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 56.
14. Id. at 55. ("All such actions in Federalor State courts are to be regardedas
arising under the laws of the United States in similarfashion to those brought under
section 301 of the Labor-ManagementRelations Act of 1947." (quoting H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 93-1280, at 327 (1974)) (emphasis added). The Court singled out § 301 of
the LMRA as having "pre-emptive force...so powerful as to displace entirely any
state cause of action 'for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization.' Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law..." Franchise Tax
Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S.
1, 23 (1983).
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that as the sole vehicle for bringing such actions, any claim that does not
comport with section 502(a)(3) cannot lie. "The six carefully integrated
civil enforcement provisions found in section 502(a)(3) of the statute
[ERISA] finally enacted...provide strong evidence that Congress did not
intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate
expressly." 5 The Court anticipated that its constriction of the source of
available civil enforcement remedies might place too much of a burden on
the courts to work within such a limited statutory framework.
2. FMC Corp. v. Holliday
FMC Corp. v. Holliday16 solidified federal preemption over state law
claims regarding the enforcement of health benefit plan provisions. The
circuits split once again, leading the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on
a Third Circuit decision challenging Pennsylvania's antisubrogation laws.
In principle however, the Court sought to clarify ERISA's preemption
language, which lies in three conflicting clauses.17
The pre-emption clause is conspicuous for its breadth. It
establishes as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of
every state law that "relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan
governed by ERISA. The saving clause returns to the States the
power to enforce those state laws that "regulate insurance,"
except as provided in the deemer clause. Under the deemer
clause, an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not
be "deemed" an insurance company, an insurer, or engaged in
the business of insurance for purposes of state laws "purporting
to regulate" insurance companies or insurance contracts.'8
Seemingly incompatible, these three provisions are illustrative of the
formidable task that courts face in interpreting ERISA. The Court
acknowledged that these provisions are "not a model of legislative
drafting."' 9

15. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 52 (citing Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985)). See also Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (holding that enforcement of subrogation/
reimbursement claims was not available under §502(a)(3)).
16. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. 52.
17. Id. at 58 (Pennsylvania's anti-subrogation law precluded insurers from
exercising subrogation rights on a claimant's tort recovery, and specifically
mentioned ERISA plans).
18. Id. The exact language contained in the clauses at issue reads:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the
provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall
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Until the decision in FMC Corp. v. Holliday, there was no definitive
answer as to which side of the line subrogation and reimbursement
provisions would fall. These "self-funded plans" became a sole province
of the federal courts after FMC Corp. v. Holliday, and theretofore did the
adjudication of subrogation and reimbursement disputes." One ambiguity
was traded for another, however, because ERISA is silent on the issue of
subrogation clauses by neither calling for their inclusion nor seeking to
regulate their content." This "gap" clearly implicates a situation where
courts should exercise their right to make federal common law in ERISA
cases. The drafters envisioned that "a federal common law
of rights and
23
obligations under ERISA-regulated plans would develop.,
3. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates
The Court in Pilot Life Insurance held ERISA's civil enforcement
provision, section 502(a)(3), to be the exclusive means of achieving

remedies. However, the Mertens v. Hewitt Associates25 decision sought to
further limit the scope of relief available under ERISA.26 Plan participants
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan.
Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause], nothing in
this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.
Neither an employee benefit plan.., nor any trust established under such
a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer,
bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the
business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks,
trust companies, or investment companies.
Id. at 57-58 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 58 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 739 (1985)).
20. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 58.
21. See Lisa N. Bleed, Enforcing Subrogation Provisions As "Appropriate
Equitable Relief' Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 727, n.47
(2001) (citing Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp. 78 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1996)).
22. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 56. "[lIt is also intended that a body of
Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." Id.
(quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits)).
23. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54.
24. Id. at 56.
25. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
26. Id.
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sought to recover monetary damages from an actuary working for the
plan, whose miscalculations led to the ultimate demise of the plan, and
qualified as a knowing breach of fiduciary duty.27 ERISA section
502(a)(3) reads as follows:
[a] civil action may be brought...by a participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations
or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the
plan.'
Succinctly put, Petitioners sought "compensatory damages-monetary
relief for all losses their plan sustained as a result of the alleged breach of
fiduciary duties., 29 The Court construed the phrase "appropriate
equitable relief," in subparagraph B to be analogous to its interpretation
of "any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate,"3 ° finding31
that both precluded "awards for compensatory or punitive damages.,
Refusing to render Congress's addition of the modifier "equitable" as
superfluous, 32 "equitable relief" was held to refer to those remedies
"typically available in equity (such as injunction,
mandamus, and
3
restitution, but not compensatory damages).
B. Formationof a CircuitSplit
Generally put, the Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the
rule as a "default" rule, while the remaining courts have either refused to
apply the rule at all, or have at least declined to do so thus far. Although
the latter courts may agree in principle, they are far divided as to the
intensity and rationale of their respective positions.
1. Eleventh Circuit
Although the Ninth Circuit was first to adopt the make-whole rule as
the default common law principle, the Eleventh Circuit employed the
principle over ten years ago in Guy v. Southeastern Iron Workers' Welfare

27. Id.
28. 29 U.SC. § 1132 (a) (2000).
29.

Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255.

30. Id. (quoting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g)(1972) (prior to 1991 Amendments)).
31. Id. (quoting United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992)).
32. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258.
33. Id. at 256.

2002]

Subrogationor Subterfuge

Fund.1 In Guy, the plan refused to honor an insured's claim for a
subsequent unrelated injury to his wife because the insured had not yet
reimbursed the plan for a claim arising out of a motorcycle accident
involving his sixteen-year-old son.3 ' Guy's third-party recovery left him
$4,784 short of being able to recover his son's medical expenses, yet the
plan sought to recover $74,595 it had paid out under the policy.36
Therefore, if the provision had been enforced, the Guys would have been
$79,379 in debt, as opposed to $4,784. 37 Accordingly, the court held that
because Guy's son had not been made whole by his third-party recovery,
the plan's right to subrogation was not mature.38
39
the Eleventh Circuit formally adopted the makeIn Cagle v. Bruner,
whole rule, relying principally on language promulgated by the Ninth
Circuit. "An ERISA plan overrides the make-whole doctrine only if it
includes language 'specifically allow[ing] the [p]lan the right of first
reimbursement out of any recovery [the participant] was able to obtain
even if [the participant] were not made whole."4 ° Central to the court's
adoption of the default rule is the proposition that standard subrogation
language will not serve to specifically reject the make-whole doctrine.4
Essentially, the default rule forecloses interpretation on behalf of plan
administrators. The default provision is implied into ambiguous language
in insurance contracts. Therefore, unless there is specific language
rejecting it, the rule applies.42
2. The Ninth Circuit'sApproach
The Ninth Circuit has consistently applied the make-whole rule. It has
been the default rule in that jurisdiction since the court's decision in
Barnes v. Independent Automobile Dealers Association of California

34. 877 F.2d 37 (11th Cir. 1989).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 39.
39. 112 F.3d 1510 (11th Cir. 1997).
40. Id. at 1522 (quoting Barnes v. Independent Automobile Dealers
Association, 64 F.3d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1995)).
41. Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1522 (citing Barnes, 64 F.3d at 1395-96 (general
subrogation language does not override make-whole doctrine)); Guy, 877 F.2d at
38-9 (applying the make-whole doctrine even though the plan had a right to
reimbursement from "all amounts recovered by suit, settlement or otherwise from
any third person or his insurer to the extent of benefits provided hereunder.").
42. Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1521-22.
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3
Health & Benefit Plan.1
"It is a general equitable principle of insurance
law that, absent an agreement to the contrary, an insurer may not enforce
a right to subrogation until the insured has been fully compensated for her
injuries, that is, has been made whole."44 Barnes involved a crystalline
make-whole scenario in which the plan did not contest that Barnes would
remain indebted for over $18,000 for medical payments if she was found
not to be entitled to retain her benefits under the plan." Nor, as is
common practice in the rubric of third-party recovery under ERISA
employee benefit plans, did the plan participate in Barnes's lawsuit against
the tortfeasor.46 Although the Ninth Circuit may exhibit a higher
propensity to find the language in a plan ambiguous, thereby applying the
make-whole doctrine, it has surpassed its sister jurisdictions in its
application of the principles behind the rule.
The Ninth Circuit has set itself apart from other circuits through its
narrow interpretation of "appropriate equitable relief" under ERISA
section 502(a)(3). Since its interpretation of the Mertens decision in FMC
Medical Plan v. Owens,47 the Ninth Circuit has held that the enforcement
of subrogation and/or reimbursement provisions do not qualify as
"appropriate equitable relief" under that section.48 It has been proposed
that subrogation provisions are no longer enforceable in the traditional
sense under ERISA in the Ninth Circuit. 9 Indeed, this may now be the
case in all federal jurisdictions, as the Supreme Court recently adopted
that Circuit's stance on the issue. °
This narrow approach has put the Ninth Circuit in direct conflict with
the other circuits, even including those that employ the make-whole rule.
A full discussion of the Ninth Circuit's rationale in Great-West Life &
Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson," follows in the next section.

43. Barnes, 64 F.3d at 1389.
44. Id. at 1394 (citing Fields v. Farmers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 831 (10th Cir. 1994)
(diversity case listing jurisdictions following the rule); See also Guy v.
Southeastern Iron Workers' Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37, 39 (11th Cir. 1989)
(ERISA case noting that subrogation right not mature until insured is reimbursed
for loss.)
45. Barnes, 64 F.3d at 1395.
46. Id.
47. FMC Medical Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997).
48. Bleed, supra note 21, at 737.
49. Id.
50. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 204.
51. Id.
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3. The Sixth Circuit'sApproach
The Sixth Circuit has also adopted the make-whole rule as its default
rule when interpreting ERISA subrogation and reimbursement
provisions,52 and relied specifically on Barnes and Cagle in doing so. In
Copeland Oaks v. Haupt,53 the Sixth Circuit held that, "in order for plan
language to conclusively disavow the default rule, it must be specific and
clear in establishing both a priority to the funds recovered and a right to
any full or partial recovery."54 This language effectually put some teeth
into the make-whole rule by requiring that plans spell out, in plain
language, how subrogation and reimbursement provisions will be
enforced. The Sixth Circuit acknowledges that it expanded the application
of the make-whole rule in Copeland Oaks.55 Moreover, it has explicitly
recognized that it has continued to apply the rule to plan language similar
to that in which other circuits have found no ambiguity and refused to do
So.

56

4. Objectors: The Remaining Circuits
The remaining circuits do not apply the make-whole doctrine as the
The Fifth Circuit for example,
default rule in their jurisdictions.
specifically disavowed the prospect of its adoption," stating "we have
serious doubts whether we would ever approve or adopt the [M]ake[W]hole rule as this circuit's default rule for the priority of recovery in
reimbursement or subrogation between an ERISA plan and its participant
or beneficiary. . ..

"8

Other circuits have similarly followed suit. The First

and Fourth Circuits refused to adopt the make-whole rule, albeit using
softer language.5 9 Both the Seventh and Tenth Circuits have also

52. Marshall v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 1997 U.S. App. LExIS 36769, at *910 (6th Cir. Dec. 1997) (per curium).
53. 209 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2000).
54. Id. at 813.
55. Qualchoice, Inc. v. Williams, 14 Fed. Appx. 417 (6th Cir. 2001); See, e.g.,
Alves v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 6 Fed. Appx. 694 (10th Cir. 2001), Paris v. Iron
Workers Trust Fund, 211 F.3d 1265 (4th Cir. 2000).
56. Qualchoice, 14 Fed. Appx. at 8 (citing Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120
F.3d 138 (8th Cir. 1997); Sunbeam-Oster Co. v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d 1368 (5th Cir.
1996)).
57. See Sunbeam-OsterCo., Inc., 102 F.3d 1378.

5& Id. at 1378.
59. Qualchoice, 14 Fed.Appx. at 420 n.1 (citing Paris v. Iron Workers Trust
Fund, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 6883 (4th Cir.) (provision that "any amounts
recovered" will be "applied first to reimburse plan" was not ambiguous; court does
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considered whether or not to adopt the make-whole rule as a default
position. In each particular case, although both circuits found that the plan
language at issue was ambiguous and decided not to apply the rule, neither
chose to preclude the prospect of adoption.'
III. IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT - RESOLUTION?
A. Great-West Life Insurance v. Knudson - Ninth Circuit
Keeping in line with the progeny of FMC Medical Plan v. Owens, the
Ninth Circuit has consistently held that enforcement of subrogation and
reimbursement provisions under ERISA section 502(a)(3) does not
constitute "appropriate equitable relief."6 ' District courts in the Ninth
Circuit have followed this line of reasoning in similar cases arising out of
the ERISA context. 62 In Great-West, the insured obtained a third-party
settlement in the amount of $650,000 sanctioned by the California State
Court, thereby resolving the status of numerous competing lienholders
not adopt make-whole doctrine), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 181 (2000)); See also
Harris v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 208 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2000). The issue
in Harrisinvolved a plan, which provided an "unqualified right to reimbursement."
Harris,208 F.3d at 277. The court found that "more particularized and technical
language" needed to be used to supplant the Plan Priority rule and chose not to
adopt the make-whole rule. Harris,208 F.3d at 280.
60. For an analysis of the Tenth Circuit, see Qualchoice, 14 Fed.Appx. at 420
(citing Alves v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2001 US App. Lexis 3608 (10th Cir.))
(provisions giving priority over "any funds" paid by a third party would be
sufficient to override make-whole rule; court does not decide whether to adopt
make-whole doctrine). For an analysis of the Seventh Circuit, see David M. Kono,
Unraveling the Lining of ERISA Health Insurer Pockets - A Vote for National
Federal Common Law Adoption of the Make-whole Doctrine, 2000 BYU L. REV.
427, 438 (2000) (citing Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.
1993)).
61. Cement Masons Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Stone, 197 F.3d 1003,
1005-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Ellis, 202 F.3d 1246, 1247-49 (9th
Cir. 2000); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., v. Knudson, No. 98-56472, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 1771 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000).
62. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mann, No. CV 00-06620, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15354 at *22-23 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2000); Federal Express Corp. v. Van
Kleef, No. C-99-4951-VRW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11253, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. June
20, 2000); Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm. of United Ass'n
Local Union No. 675 v. Foster, 186 F.Supp. 2d 114, 121 (D. Haw. 2001);
BankAmerica Pension Plan v. McMath, No. C 97-3242 CRB, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2805, at *33-40 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
63. Great-West, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1771, at *3.

20021

Subrogation or Subterfuge

The plan sought reimbursement for $411,157 that it paid out for medical
expenses under the plan, even though the settlement attributed only five
percent or $13,828 to medical expenses.m
In its most recent decision on the issue, Great-West Life Insurance v.
Knudson, the Ninth Circuit relied on the core holding in FMC Medical.
"[A]ctions brought by fiduciaries to enforce recovery provisions in ERISA
plans are actions not for 'equitable relief within the meaning of
§1132(a)(3),' but rather for money damages., 65 By virtue of this narrow
interpretation of the Mertens decision, the court held that equitable relief
was limited to its traditional forms such as injunction, mandamus or
restitution; it specifically excluded monetary damages.6 In further
explicating its somewhat arcane interpretation, the "Ninth Circuit
explained that the right of reimbursement is not an equitable one of
subrogation, in which the plan administrator 'step[s] into the shoes' of the
as 'the return of
beneficiary, nor of "restitution," which the court defined
67
'ill-gotten assets' but rather one for money damages."
This line of Ninth Circuit decisions does not directly apply the makewhole rule. However, the court's commitment to its underlying principles
is plainly implicit, as it has effectively precluded plans from enforcing
subrogation and/or reimbursement provisions in situations where the
insured would be left "incomplete," insofar as repayment of the financial
obligations arising from his claim. The language in these cases could be
construed to preclude any enforcement of subrogation and/or
reimbursement clauses, even when the insured may achieve double
recovery.
B. Great-West Life Insurance v. Knudson - Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Great-West Life Insurance v.
Knudson6' in order to provide an answer to the following question: "Did
the [Ninth] 9th Circuit err in holding that an employee benefit plan
regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
cannot sue in federal court to recoup reimbursement for the medical

64. Id.
65. Mayer, Brown, & Platt, ERISA - Actions to Recoup Medical Benefits (Jan.
22, 200), at http://appellate.netldocketreports/sc20503678.asp.
66. FMC Medical, 122 F.3d at 1261.
67. Mayer, Brown & Platt, supra note 65 (citing FMC Medical Plan v. Owens,
122 F.3d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1997).
68. Great West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, cert. granted, 531 U.S.
I124 (2001).

Journalof ContemporaryHealth Law and Policy

[Vol. 19:309

benefits paid to a beneficiary from the winnings of that beneficiary's
personal injury settlement?, 69 The Court previously granted certiorari to
another Ninth Circuit case, Reynolds Metal Co. v. Ellis," where the parties

subsequently reached a private settlement7' and the suit was dismissed."
Principally the Court sought to resolve a circuit split." The Great-West
decision expressly contravened rulings of the Seventh, Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits. 4
In an unexpected75 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning. 6 Reiterating its holding in Mertens, the Court
77
maintained, "equitable relief must mean something less than all relief.,
78
It is established Court practice to consider only those issues before it.

69. Great-West Life Ins., et al. v. Knudson, Janette, et vir., 99-1786, On the
Docket - Medill School of Journalism, 2001-02 Term, (Nov. 2, 2002), at
http://www.medill.northwestern.edu/docket/cases.srch?-database=docket&layout=lasso&-response= %2fdocket%2fdetail.srch&-recordlD=32948&-search.
70. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Ellis, cert. granted, 531 U.S. 1009 (2000).
71. Bleed, supra note 21, at 738.
72. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Ellis, cert. dismissed, 531 U.S. 1061 (2000).
73. EBIA Weekly, Agreed Dismissal of Case Precludes Supreme Court Ruling
in Reynolds on Whether Federal Jurisdiction Exists to Enforce ERISA
Subrogation/Reimbursement Clauses, (Jan. 4, 2001), at http://www.ebia.com/
weekly/articles/2001/ERISA010104Reynolds.html.
74. Mayer, Brown & Platt, supra note 65 (citing decisions that directly conflict
with Great-West in that a claim for monetary relief is 'equitable' under section
502(a)(3)). See Administrative Committee v. Gauf, 188 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 1999);
Southern Council of Industrial Workers v. Ford, 83 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1996); Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama v. Sanders, 138 F. 3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1998).
"The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have reasoned that such an action seeks
specific performance of the reimbursement clause of the contract, an equitable
remedy." Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 138 F.3d at 1347. (citing Gauf,
188 F.3d at 771).
75. Robert N. Eccles, David E. Gordon, O'Melveny & Meyers, Washington,
D.C. and Los Angeles, CA, ERISA Litigation Reporter, October 2001, Section:
From the Editors, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 1 (2001) ("We think it's unlikely that the Court
will agree with the 9th [Ninth] Circuit's rationale, but beyond that, it's anyone's
guess as to what the Court will say.").
76. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 208.
77. Id. at 209.
78. Owasso Independent School Dist. v. Falvo, 122 S.Ct. 934, 938 (2002)
(quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998)) ("We need not resolve the
question here as it is our practice 'to decide cases on the grounds raised and
considered in the Court of Appeals and included in the question on which we
granted certiorari.').
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However, the opinion written by Justice Scalia is so narrowly tailored that
there is sparse mention of the underlying facts, rendering the opinion
merely an esoteric and methodical construction of what 'equitable relief'
means under section 502(a)(3). The Court gave considerable deference to
ERISA's enforcement scheme first by labeling the act a "comprehensive
and reticulated statute,"7 and then noting its reluctance "to tamper with
[the] enforcement scheme embodied in the statute by extending remedies
not specifically authorized by its text.""' Through this abstract treatment
of the case at bar, the Court has essentially taken the Ninth Circuit's end
run around the increased difficulty of applying the make-whole rule, and
created a dubious precedent. The questionable effect of the Great-West
decision is outlined in the subsequent discussion.
IV. ANALYSIS
The arguments voiced by those opposed to the adoption of the makewhole doctrine as the default rule in ERISA subrogation and/or
reimbursement actions have not fallen on deaf ears. Since the Ninth
Circuit began to decide such disputes on the grounds it set forth in FMC
Medical, and received its blessing by the Supreme Court in Great-West,
only two circuits still employ the rule as a default.8 ' The battle between
the conflicting principles of subrogation and the make-whole doctrine82
will now be further complicated by those circuits that continue to oppose
the rule, as they exploit the vast loopholes inherent in the Court's decision.
The following analysis first lays out the ultimate inefficacy of the GreatWest decision. The subsequent discussion will dissect some of the more
prevalent contentions raised in favor of per se enforcement of subrogation
and/or reimbursement rights, and theretofore discard the make-whole rule
as an applicable federal common law doctrine.

79. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 209. (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508
U.S. 248, 251 (1993)) ("[ERISA] is product of a decade of congressional study of
the Nation's private employee benefit system." (quoting Nachman Corp. v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
80. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 209. (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985)).
81. The Sixth and the Eleventh Circuits continue to have the default rule in
place. Although the Ninth Circuit has in no way repudiated its adoption of the
make-whole rule, the court employs a different rationale to reach the same result.
See FMC Medical, 122 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997).
82. Kono, supra note 60, at 434.
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A. The Great-West Decision: The Exceptions that Swallowed the Rule
Great West has done little, if anything, to obviate the actual controversy
created by subrogation and reimbursement language in ERISA cases. The
most poignant lack of redress is to be felt where beneficiaries are not
made whole:
We express no opinion as to whether petitioners could have
intervened in the state-court tort action brought by respondents
or whether a direct action by petitioners against respondents
asserting state-law claims such as breach of contract would have
been pre-empted by ERISA.
Nor do we decide whether
petitioners could have obtained equitable relief against
respondents' attorney and the trustee of the Special Needs Trust
[for distribution settlement proceeds]... '
These few sentences take the teeth out of an opinion that can otherwise
be read to embody make-whole principles, as the Ninth Circuit clearly
intended by FMC Medical and its progeny. In establishing the litmus test
for whether a remedy sought is legal or equitable in nature, thereby
permitted under section 502(a)(3), the Court looks to the "nature of the
underlying remedies sought." ' More telling is the condition upon an
equitable lien that "the money or property identified belong in good
conscience to the plaintiff . . ."85 An insurer that purports to cover a
beneficiary for a loss and then seeks to effectively take back that coverage
simply because there was a third-party recovery, even though the
"beneficiary" has not achieved recovery, claim subrogation or
reimbursement of funds in "good conscience."
In the recent Seventh Circuit decision, Administrative Committee of
Wal-Mart v. Varco, the district court denied a defendant-beneficiary's
motion to dismiss, "insofar as it state[d] a claim for imposition of [a]
constructive trust on particular property in the hands of defendants .... "6
The beneficiary's attorney had control of funds obtained in the third-party
settlement, and began the process of dispersing them to various
lienholders.87 Based on the Supreme Court's language in Great-West,
83. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 220.
84. Id. at 213. (citing Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th
Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.).
85. Id. at 213. (citing 1 D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 4.3(1), at 587-88 (2d
ed. 1993); Restatement of Restitution, §160, Comment a, at 641-42 (1936); 1 G
PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.4, p. 17; § 3.7, p 262 (1978).
86. Admin. Cmte. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Varco, No. 01-C8277, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 530, at *15 (N.D. I11.Jan. 14, 2002).
87. Id. at *5.
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"where the 'property [sought to be recovered] or its proceeds have been
dissipated so that no product remains, [the plaintiff's] claim is only that of
a general creditor,' and the plaintiff 'cannot enforce a constructive trust of
or an equitable lien upon other property of the [defendant]."'" Here, the
court allowed an action almost substantively identical to that of a typical
ERISA subrogation or reimbursement claim against a beneficiary under
section 502(a)(3) on the basis that it was the beneficiary's attorney, rather
than the beneficiary who was in possession of the third-party settlement
funds; the funds had yet to be dispersed, and therefore not 'dissipated'. 9
Simply by allowing the beneficiary's attorney to be named as a codefendant, the district court circumvented any binding effect of GreatWest. The court noted, however, that the defendants did not seek state
court adjudication of their third-party tort claim prior to disbursement of
the settlement proceeds.' This is a significant departure from the facts in
Great-West.
Allowing such claims to proceed facially contravenes not only
established Supreme Court precedent set forth in Pilot's Life Insurance"
and FMC Corp.,92 but goes against ERISA's well-defined goal of
uniformity.93 The same holds true for Justice Scalia's allusion that a
breach of contract claim to enforce subrogation and/or reimbursement
rights may lie as a direct action under state-law, or at least the question
unanswered 94 as the Court has yet to be confronted with the issue.95 What
is certain, however, is that ERISA plan providers will attempt to invoke
that rationale when seeking subrogation and/or reimbursement. If any of
these claims are allowed to proceed, whether by naming the beneficiary's
attorney or trustee as a co-defendant, or by allowing state court breach of
contract claims to adjudicate ERISA subrogation/reimbursgment clauses,
the Great-West decision is rendered utterly meaningless. Moreover, every
state and circuit jurisdiction retains its prerogative to decide which claims
will go forward, and as a result it eliminates ERISA's goal of uniformity.96

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

94.
443, at
95.

96.

Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213-14.
Admin. Cmte. of the Wal-Mart Stores, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 530 at *11.
Id. at *7-8.
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 56.
FMC Corp., 489 U.S. at 58.
Admin. Cmte of the Wal-Mart Stores, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 530 at * 15.
Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, No. 00-C6869, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
*30 n.2 (N.D. I11.
Jan. 11, 2002) (citing Great-West, 534 at 204, 210-11).
Great-West, 534 U.S. 214.
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 56.
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In deciding Great-West, the Court dismissed the aforementioned
concerns, "even assuming ... that petitioners are correct about the preemption of previously available state court actions' or the lack of other
means to obtain relief, vague notions of a statute's 'basic purpose' are
nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of its test regarding the
specific issue under consideration."' 97 The language of section 502(a)(3),
restricting the remedies available to fiduciaries to those equitable in
nature,98
allowed
the
Court
to
avoid
resolving
the
subrogation/reimbursement dispute that was the substantive issue in
Great-West. Nonetheless, the Court has effectively turned up the heat on
this issue and the nationwide disparity will continue to persist until it again
comes before the Supreme Court. The aforementioned escape route will
not be available in that instance, on two distinguishing grounds. First, it is
submitted that the goal of uniformity strikes at the very heart of ERISA,
as evidenced by legislative intent. 99 Second, ERISA is silent on the issue
of subrogation. 1°° Upholding the federal common law enactment of the
make-whole rule by granting certiorari to any one of the cases up for
consideration, preferably one arising out of the Sixth Circuit, would avert
dealing with this potentially insoluble conflict and advance the true
purpose of ERISA.
B. Double-Dipping
The policy against double recovery is to prevent an insured, who has
been fully compensated by the benefits paid out under his policy as set
forth in the insurance contract, from "coming out ahead" by suing a thirdparty tortfeasor'O
"Recognition and enforcement of a right of
subrogation for health insurers is primarily premised on precluding
duplicative recoveries."'02 The make-whole rule is wholly in accordance
with this principle. The mere fact that it can be applied in a given situation
is indicative of that absence of one full recovery, much less two. In his
Amicus Brief on behalf of the plan in Great-West, the Solicitor General
contends, that "[i]f equitable reimbursement is ordered in these
circumstances, respondents [insured] will not lose anything to which they

97.
9&
99.
100.
101.
102.

Great-West, 534 U.S. at 220 (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993)).
Id.
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 56.
See Bleed, supra note 21.
Kono, supra note 60, at 444-45.
Sunbeam-Oster Co., 102 F.3d at 1376 n.24 (citing KEETON, ROBERT E., &
WIDIss, ALAN I., INSURANCE LAW § 3.10(a)(7), at 231 (1988)).
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are entitled under the terms of the plan, and the plan will not gain
anything to which it is not entitled under the terms of the plan."'0 3
ERISA was enacted in order to comprehensively regulate employee
benefit plans, which are those,
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment ....0
If ERISA plans are created to provide employees [insured] with said
benefits, then it is wholly incongruous to allow plans (through subrogation
and/or reimbursement rights) to "take back" the benefits they paid, when
the insured will be left unable to pay the debt arising out of the very
events or incidents for which they were to be insured. Plan subrogation
and/or reimbursement rights do not accrue until the insured has obtained
recovery from a third party, nor may the plan seek reimbursement in the
excess of that third-party recovery "[i]f a beneficiary's recovery from a
Is an
,,.0'
third-party is less than the total expenses paid by the plan .
insured that has not been made whole in fact any different than one who
failed to obtain any third-party recovery at all?
The facts in Sunbeam-Oster, the most vehement refusal to adopt the
make-whole rule, illustrate the fundamental flaw in this reasoning. The
district court found that the insured incurred a total of $2,500,000 in
damages."° He received $137,000 of benefits paid from the plan towards
his medical bills' 7 and obtained a $500,000 lump sum settlement from the
tortfeasor. °8 In declining to adopt the make-whole rule, the Fifth Circuit
ordered the insured to reimburse the plan, dollar for dollar, for all

103. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at
7, Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (No. 991786) (May 10, 2001), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supremecourt
/briefs/99-1786/1999-1786.mer.ami.html.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(2000).
105. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner,
supra note 103.
106. Sunbeam-Oster Co., 102 F.3d at 1372 (The total amount reflects $2,000,000
allocated to the insured, and an additional $500,000 for his wife and son).
107. Id. at 1370.
108. Id.
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qualifying expenditures made on its behalf."° In essence, it is the plan that
obtains double recovery from the vantage point of a single participant in a
make-whole situation. In the absence of a third-party recovery, the plan
may have to pay out benefits, but it still has one "recovery" based upon
the payment of insurance premiums.1
Subrogation then, provides for a
second "recovery" by the plan if the insured collects damages from a third
party, and if that right is indeed enforceable."'
C Unjust Enrichment
Legislative background of ERISA clearly indicates that Congress' chief
concern was protecting the interests of the workers, citing that, "the
absolute need that safeguards for plan participants be sufficiently
adequate and effective to prevent the numerous inequities to workers
under plans which have resulted in tragic hardship to so many.""' If the
make-whole rule is not applied, the plan, at the end of the day, will have
provided no benefits except forestalling bill collectors. Those in favor of
unconditional enforcement of subrogation and/or reimbursement
provisions cast the insured as an opportunist,
[w]hen a plan expressly conditions the payment of medical
benefits on a subsequent reimbursement to the plan out of funds
recovered from a third party tortfeasor, the participant or
beneficiary is unjustly enriched when he or she retains the
amount recovered from a third party and does not reimburse the
plan.
Pursuant to the clear logic that there is no "double recovery" when the
make-whole rule applies, it follows that there cannot be unjust
enrichment. Applying the make-whole rule to subrogation under an
ERISA plan is "consistent with the prevention of unjust enrichment.""' 4

109. Id. at 1379.
110. Kono, supra note 60, at 446.
111. Id. at 443-44.
112. Id. at 443 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 9 (1974), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4674).
113. Brief of United as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitoner, supra note
103.
114. Barnes, 64 F.3d at 1394 (citing Germany v. Operating Eng'rs Trust Fund,
789 F. Supp. 1165, 1171 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating prevention of unjust enrichment is
the rationale for the equitable doctrine of subrogation, and that avoiding double
recovery, which is the purpose of subrogation as per the SPD, will not be served in
the instant case because the insured's anticipated recovery is far exceeds his
losses).
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Restitution is the classic remedy for unjust enrichment in the
subrogation/reimbursement context."5 The general principle of restitution
is that "one person should not be permitted to unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another, but should be required to make restitution of or
for property or benefits received . . . where it is just and equitable that
such restitution be made ... " 6 In FMC Medical, the Ninth Circuit held
that a claim for restitution required a showing of ill-gotten assets, further
Using the following
constricting its interpretation of Mertens."7
hypothetical fact pattern, the unjust enrichment rationale also fails:
$100,000 total loss, $30,000 plan provided benefit, $70,000 third-party
recovery; followed by reimbursement to the plan for the $30,000 of benefit
provided.
Justice Ginsberg's dissent in Great-West proposes that ERISA insurers
have a substantive basis for an unjust enrichment claim based on the
beneficiary's "unjust gain."' ..8 Justice Ginsberg posits that an employee's
right to backpay awards under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" is
analogous to the ERISA insurer's right to the beneficiary having received
what she believes properly belongs to the insurer. This analogy only
succeeds if the beneficiary recovers an amount in excess of what is
necessary to make them whole. Otherwise it is fundamentally flawed.
Another caveat to this comparison is that backpay awards are "specifically
authorized as equitable relief under Title VII,"'"2 whereas ERISA is silent
on the subrogation issue.'2' In a Title VII claim, it is the employer's illegal
act(s) that trigger the employee's right to backpay, whereas the ERISA
beneficiary in the make-whole scenario is wholly innocent of any
wrongdoing and most likely the victim of a horrific accident.
The Court's rendering of ERISA's enforcement scheme in Great-West
should be expounded upon to allow the insurer to seek restitution for
unjust enrichment under section 502(a)(3) only if the beneficiary recovers
in excess, as this would be an "unjust gain" by any gauge.
115. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner,
supra note 103, at 7.
116. Amber M. Anistine, ERISA Qualified Subrogation Liens: Should They be
Reduced to Reflect a Pro Rata Share of Attorney Fees?, 104 DICK. L. REV. 359, 372
(2000) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1535 (6th ed. 1990)).
117. Bleed, supra note 21, at 742.
118. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 229 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
119. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2000).
120. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 230 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Teamsters v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 572 (1990)).
121. Bleed, supra note 21, at 734 n.47.
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Whenever the legal title to property is obtained through means or
under circumstances 'which render it unconscientious for the
holder of the legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest,
equity impresses a constructive trust on the property thus
acquired in favor of the one who is truly and equitably entitled to
the same .... 122
A beneficiary who was made whole has no right in equity, nor legal
title, to any excess plan proceeds; he can fully reimburse the insurer and
still remain "complete."
An example of reimbursement language
embodying this rationale, as well as the make-whole rule, is the following:
[i]n no event will the amount of reimbursement to the US [the
insurer] exceed the lesser of [t]he amount actually paid under
the policy; or [t]he amount actually recovered from that part of
the judgment or settlement in excess of the amount necessary to
fully reimburse the Covered Person for out-of-pocket expenses
incurred, including attorney fees.'
Ironically, in Primax Recoveries, Inc., v. Sevilla,14 a recent case in which
the above clause was considered, the district court postulated that GreatWest would render any claim for reimbursement under section 502(a)(3)
outside of its federal subject matter jurisdiction, 25 clearly highlighting the
inadequacy of that decision.
C Posner- Economic Reliance?
In Cutting v. Jerome Foods, the Seventh Circuit declined to adopt the
make-whole rule even though it recognized that the insured, Mrs. Cutting,
would incur an additional $90,000 in uncompensated non-medical costs if
subrogation was permitted.2 1 Many state courts, in applying the rule, have
held that boilerplate subrogation language was not intended to have the
effect of curtailing coverage. 2 In Cutting, Judge Posner highlighted this
reasoning.
To put this differently, rejection of the 'make-whole' makes
subrogation a lot like assignment.
If insurance contracts
required the insured to assign any tort claim he might have to
the insurer, the price of the insurance would be lower but

122. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 215-16 (emphasis in original).
123. Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, No. 00-C6869, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
443, at *2 (citing PI. Compl. Ex. A.).
124. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 443 (2002).
125. Primax Recoveries, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 443, at *12.
126. Cutting, 993 F. 2d at 1298.
127. Id. at 1297.
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effective coverage would also be lower. The insured would
recover only the policy limits, and not his full damages, even in a
case in which the judgment had been secured against the
tortfeasor, and collected for those damages.'2
Although the Seventh Circuit ultimately chose not to adopt the makewhole rule, it did not go as far as some of its sister circuits and eliminate
the possibility altogether. 29
Judge Posner postulates however, that the "[a]ssignment. . .[of the]
insured's tort rights to the insurance company, reduces the price of
insurance and thus enables the insured to obtain more coverage."' 3 This
theory makes the assumption that insurance providers take collections
made attributable to enforcement of subrogation and reimbursement
rights into account. "[P]remium calculations do not reflect potential
subrogation collections"' 3 ' and they are not a factor in the ratedetermining formulae used by commercial insurers to establish
premiums.'32 The "conjectural and remote nature of subrogation militates
against its inclusion as a factor for consideration in the setting of premium
rates,"'33 thereby making its exclusion a legitimate one. It is the resulting
windfall to the insurer, however, that is illegitimate.' 3'
D. Pervasive Trend - The Limiting of the Application of the MakeWhole Rule
Even the Sixth Circuit, the most ardent supporter of the make-whole
rule in both application and rhetoric, acknowledges that it is merely a
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1298-99.
Id. at 1298.
See Kono, supra note 60, at 446 (citing JOHN V. DOBBIN, INSURANCE LAW
INA NUTSHELL 284 (3d ed. 1996)).
132. Id. at 446-47.
(1) the proportionate part of the total predicted cost of meeting specified
types of losses in the ventures that have been grouped by the insurer into
a "pool of risks," (2) appropriate amounts for a reserve fund in the event
the total risk was underestimated, (3) the administrative costs of the
insurer, (4) other expenses of doing business (including fees for sales
representatives such as agents and brokers), and (5) profits for companies
engaging in insurance as a business enterprise.
Id. at 446 (citing Roger M. Baron, Subrogation: A Pandora's Box Awaiting
Closure, 41 S.D.D. L. REV. 237, 244 n.44 (1996) (quoting ROBERT E. KEETON &
128.
129.
130.
131.

ALAN

133.
134.

I.

WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW

Id.
Id.

§1.3(b)(2) (1988)).
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default rule.'
Generally speaking, 3 6 if a plan adequately sets out its
extent of subrogation/reimbursement rights, the deciding court will be
forced to recognize that no silence or ambiguity exists and enforce the
provision at issue.'37 It follows then, that plan providers will eventually be
able to write plan language sufficient enough to preclude any application
of the make-whole rule. Inherent in its origin as a doctrine of federal
common law, it can "only be applied as a gap-filler where a clause is found
to be ambiguous or silent on a particular issue.""' 38
By adopting the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of what constitutes
"appropriate equitable relief,"' 39 the Supreme Court called into question
the enforceability of ERISA subrogation/reimbursement provisions under
federal subject matter jurisdiction.'" However, this is no more equitable to
insurers,
who
may
be
defrauded
by
beneficiaries,
than
subrogation/reimbursement enforcement is in the absence of complete
recovery. Furthermore, this directly contravenes ERISA's goal that
"plans and plan sponsors should be subject to a uniform body of benefits
law,"' 4 as demonstrated to wit: "[O]ne participant (Edgar) should not be
allowed to retain benefits belonging to the plan, while another (Susan) is
held to the terms of the plan - all participants must be uniformly held to
the terms of the plan.' 42 Given that ERISA pre-emption precludes plans
from being able to seek enforcement of their subrogation and/or
reimbursement rights in state court, 43 federal courts must remain open to

135. Marshall,1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36769, at *12.
136. This statement must be couched as a generalization, for different courts
interpreting similar, if not identical language have reached juxtaposed conclusions
as to the presence of ambiguity, thereby causing a disparity of standards among the
federal appellate circuit. Qualchoice, Inc. v. Williams, 14 Fed. Appx. 417, 420 n.1
(6th Cir. 2001).
137. See Kono, supra note 60, at 443.
138. Marshall, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36769, at *10 (citing Lyman Lumber Co.
v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 1989); Sanders v. Scheideler, 816 F. Supp. 1338,
1347 (W.D. Wis. 1993), affd 25 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir. 1994).
139. FMC Medical, 122 F.3d at 1261.
140. Primax Recoveries, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 443 at *12.
141. Bleed, supra note 21, at 741 'n.108 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60
(1990) (stating that the "[a]pplication of differing state subrogation laws to plans
... frustrate plan administrators' continuing obligation to calculate uniform benefit
levels nationwide.").
142. Bleed, supra note 21, at 748.
143. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 52.
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hear these claims or no remedy will exist.'44 The Supreme Court's decision
in Great-West has done little to resolve this issue, and most likely created a
plethora of new controversies.
E. Preservationof Principle
As the viability of the make-whole rule is continually called into
question, alternative grounds must be presented to entrench its place in
the ERISA scheme. The Sixth Circuit's activist approach in Copeland
Oaks, requiring affirmative preclusion of reading the make-whole rule into
plan language, 45 is a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, artfully
written plan provisions may still be able to sidestep the default rule. If
Copeland Oaks was expanded however, it could prove a formidable
obstacle. "ERISA insists that the SPD [Summary Plan Description,
hereinafter SPD] be couched in ordinary conversational terms,
understandable by the average reasonable employee, and not in verbose
'legalese' or 'insurance speak.' '1 4 6 It is doubtful that a "person of average
intelligence and experience""' would realize the prospective ramifications
of the following statement taken from typical plan language:
[a]s a condition to the Plan making payments for any medical or
dental charges, the Covered Person must assign to the Plan his
or her rights to any recovery arising out of or related to any act
or omission that caused or contributed to the Injury or Sickness
for which such benefits are to be paid.4 8
Wording analogous to "the plan will seek to recoup its payment of
benefits to you in the event of any third-party recovery, irrespective of the
reality that such action may leave you debt-ridden, insolvent, or without
further remedy," may be more appropriate.
It is unequivocally clear that employees can contract away their right to
be made whole.'49 If the SPD were required to set forth a hypothetical
scenario, perhaps akin to the fact pattern in Sunbeam-Oster where the
insured was left to contend with over $2,000,000 in uncompensated
damages, 5 ° the bargaining regime of ERISA health plans would be

144. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1352 n.5
(11th Cir. 1998).
145. Copeland Oaks, 209 F.3d at 813.
146. Sunbeam-Oster, 102 F.3d at 1375 n. 20 (citations omitted).
147. Id.
148.
149.

Copeland Oaks, 209 F.3d at 814.
Cutting, 993 F.2d at 1295.

150. Sunbeam-Oster, 102 F.3d at 1372.
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fundamentally altered. Suppose also that employees were apprised of the
harsh reality that with the combined burden of insurance policy
limitations, aversion to litigation, high contingency fees"' and exigent
financial need, their cases will often be settled in amounts insufficient to
make them whole.'52 In fact, "[e]mployer compliance with the provision of
understandable summary annual reports was so weak as to prompt
Department of Labor regulations specifying the language of those
reports. '
Another remedial solution under a make-whole rule, albeit one subject
to potential uniformity issues, would be to give binding effect to court
sanctioning of an insured's settlement and/or damage award, so that a
court certified pro rata amount allocable to medical expenses could be
dispersed to the plan under their subrogation and/or reimbursement lien.
Failure of the beneficiary to take action to have the third-party settlement
adjudicated in state court was one of the distinguishing facts from GreatWest, that allowed the insurer's claim to move forward in Administrative
Committee of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Varco." The district court in
Great-West limited the plan's reimbursement to $13,828, even though it
had paid out $411,157 in benefits.' 5 The California state court oversaw the
settlement in which only five percent, or $13,828, was apportioned to
medical expenses. 5 6 When disputes over the proper division of settlement
awards arise, it is the duty of the factfinder to provide the proper solution,
as is the case with questions of duplicative recovery. 1'' The Sixth Circuit
has in fact remanded cases where there was significant question as to the
extent of the insured's injuries with respect to being made whole.'
The
logical consequence of these types of decisions will be increased litigation.
This is in line with the argument that the make-whole rule is
"administratively more complex, requiring the medical insurer to calculate

151. See Kono, supra note 60, at 448 (In most large cases, an injured insured
pays a contingency fee of thirty-three to forty percent for legal representation).
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C.F.R. § 2520.104b-10(d) (1994)).
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155. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 207-09.
156. Id. at 209.
157. Phillips v. Healthcare Recoveries, Inc., No. 98-6369, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis
33700, at *9 (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 2000).
158. Phillips,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33700, at *12.
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the insured's total medical loss and nonmedical loss," thereby making
insurance more expensive, as the 'additional coverage' provided under the
rule will surely raise costs."' Given the alternative-recovery from a
catastrophic injury while facing monstrous debt or even the prospect of
insolvency, the "person of average intelligence and experience,"" 6 would
clearly incur the additional, moreover minimal, costs of full coverage
under the make-whole rule.
V. CONCLUSION
Equity is "the body of principles constituting what is fair and
right.""6 Although the Supreme Court's decision in Great-West can be
built upon or even be considered as a step in the right direction, it will
easily be bypassed by fancy lawyering without a decision formally
adopting the make-whole rule as the default rule in enforcing subrogation
and reimbursement rights under ERISA. The rule has proved to be a
salient and workable solution in those jurisdictions where it has been
implemented.
As the following remarks of Justice Stevens clearly
annunciate:
[firom the standpoint of the beneficiaries of ERISA plans-who
after all are the primary beneficiaries of the entire statutory
program-there is no apparent reason for treating self-insured
plans differently from insured plans. Why should a self-insured
plan have a right to enforce a subrogation clause against an
injured employee while an insured plan may not? The notion
that this disparate treatment of similarly situated beneficiaries is
somehow supported by an interest in uniformity is singularly
unpersuasive. If Congress had intended such an irrational result,
surely it would have expressed it in straightforward English. At
least one would expect that the reasons for drawing such an
apparently irrational distinction would be discernible in the
legislative history or in the literature discussing the legislation.162
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